Introduction

The SCA was created by people who wanted to recreate the chivalric ideals of the High Middle Ages and embraced by people who wanted to club each other with sticks. For the former we have the pagentry and spectacle of the tournament, for the latter the mud and confusion of the battlefield. I’m a hit’em-with-sticks person myself and when circumstances prevented me from active participation in the SCA for several years I set out to learn about becoming a better melee fighter. What I discovered was, at first, disheartening. There simply wasn’t much information out there for the SCA melee fighter. The secrets of melee fighting, like those of individual fighting, were/are locked in the heads of experienced heavy fighters throughout the known world. It was actually easier to locate good quality treatises on single combat than it is to find treatises of any sort on melee combat.[1]

After I had thought about this a great deal, and done a lot of searching and reading in the meanwhile, I came to understand the reasons why this is so. To begin with, single combat is simpler than a melee. There is no need to communicate your intent to ten different minds, no need to coordinate your actions, no need to have a picture of what’s going on more than twenty feet away, and in general fewer options of all sorts. I am not downplaying the skills required to be a good heavy fighter, just trying to point out that single combat is generally less complicated than melee combat. You are, of course, welcome to disagree. Furthermore, many experienced melee fighters do not publish their thoughts and experiences. Some are not interested in this, some feel that they have little to contribute, and others are interested in protecting their arcane and hard-won knowledge. What discourses on SCA melee combat exist are generally of a like nature. The author is introduced, the publication of the piece is justified, the nature of the problem is stated, and solutions are provided in the form of organizational and tactical suggestions organized, more or less, according the views of the author.

I am not qualified to write this article. While this seems, on the face of it, to be an absurd statement to write on the first page of a 30+ page work it is still my honest opinion. I’ve read a great deal, I’ve observed and theorized, but I’ve never led large groups in SCA melees. In fact, my friends have a saying “Don’t let Jester make the plan” based on my performances leading small groups. Let there be no doubt as to my lack of qualifications and my complete awareness of this fact. Nor am I a good single combat fighter. I have never made the time to approach SCA fighting with the proper attitude and commitment so I’m as bad now as I was when I started in 1991. This article represents very little original thought on my part, however. 99% of the information contained in this paper has been drawn from a wide range of sources: books, articles, newsgroups, personal conversations, classes, etc…

The organization of the article and the intellectual distinctions that I make are largely based on the doctrines of the United States Army. The opinions I express regarding how melee fighting should be conducted in the SCA are largely based on the doctrines of Anglesey. This is the background I am coming from and, though I constantly strive to be objective, it colors my perceptions. I would like to express my thanks to Baltazar of Anglesey. Baltazar is the person most responsible for introducing me to the SCA and teaching me the joys of melee fighting. The ideas that lead to the research which resulted in this article were given to me by him. Thanks, Bzar.

What I hope to do in this article is provide a starting point for future discussions on this subject. I will put forth my opinions, theories, and conceptual organization for all who care to comment and critique. I hope that genuine knowledge will acrete around this article in much the same manner that an oyster creates pearls.

Organization

Principles

In the course of my readings on ancient and medieval military history I came to believe that SCA combat can be divided into three levels which closely mirror certain time periods and systems. The first level is single combat. The single combat closely resembles the jousts and tournaments of the High Middle Ages in Western Europe.[2] Single combat is exemplified by Crown Tournaments and the events hosted by the various tournament companies. The second level is small group combat. Small group combats are the melees that take place at countless fighter practices and small tourneys throughout the world. They closely resemble primitive tribal combat from any time and place. The third level is the large group combat. Large group combat takes place only at large events such as Pennsic, Gulf Wars, Estrella, and Lillies. It is fairly rare and closely resembles the battles that took place in Greece prior to the Peleponesian Wars. There are no clearly defined gradients that separate these levels. They exist on a sliding scale where one level transitions gradually into the next.

SCA large group combat (hereafter referred to as 'melees') is an artificial construct. We adhere to rules which compromise the realism of the simulation for the purposes of making it reasonably safe. So, from the very beginning we deviate from reality and there is no going back. This means that while we may attempt to recreate Medieval history, we can never truly achieve this goal in all aspects at all times. Some truths, however, remain unaffected by our deviations.

The most fundamental of these truths is that logistics drives organization. Simply put, you can only create and sustain an army that you can supply. Depending on the time and place and level of development of the art and science of warfare there are various functions that can be lumped together under the broad heading of logistics. The four most common functions are: Supply, Transport, Maintenance, and Services. The ability of a state or organization to meet the needs that these functions represent largely determines the type of military organization they can create and sustain.

The fall of the Roman Empire and the rise of the feudal states provides an excellent example of this. Consider the Roman military system after the time of Marius. The army was composed of professional soldiers, primarily infantry, who lived and trained in large groups. This was made possible by an economic and political infrastructure capable of marshalling the resources needed to support such an organization[3]. Contrast this with the feudal military system that came after the fall of Rome. Medieval monarchs were not ignorant, they knew of the Roman military system (which continued in various forms in Constantinople) but they were unable or unwilling (due to political concerns, how many Barracks Emperors were there?) to support large, standing armies of infantry[4].

To determine what form of organization you wish to use you must first look at all the factors which affect your ability to create the army or unit you want. Frankly, attempting to list all of these factors would be boring and largely unproductive since the factors can vary from place to place and time to time. Of the four general factors (supply, transportation, maintenance, and services) the first three are summarily dumped on the individual participant. The fourth, services, is largely a function that is filled on an as-needed basis by volunteers. The one aspect of services that I am concerned with is training.

Because this is a game (a point I will reiterate ad naseum throughout this article) we tend to more closely resemble the medieval model than the Roman model of organization and training. This model is based on the patron-client model that prevailed among the Germanic tribes that superceded Rome.[5] Military training models can be thought to exist on a sliding scale. At one extreme lies the warrior model of organization, at the the other the soldier model. The warrior model emphasizes individual training while the soldier method emphasizes group training. Most organizations tend to fall somewhere between the two extremes. In the SCA the typical organization tends to favor the warrior method. There are many good reasons for this. The creation of effective large units requires a substantial logistical commitment. In modern terms we would have to require a commitment of time and effort that many people are unable or unwilling to make. It is much easier to create a set of standard commands and educate individuals. In this way the lone fighter in the Canton of Middle of Nowhere can integrate himself into any unit formed from the fighters of his Kingdom.

Because this is a game, and most of us have busy lives outside our hobby, there is a strong tendency to reduce the amount of work to the absolute minimum. For this reason, foremost among many others, the SCA tends to favor a warrior system organization. I do not. I favor a soldier system organization because I feel that a tight unit will react better than a group of individuals when the plan goes bad, and the plan always goes bad. I believe that my system does not replace the warrior system organization, rather it refines and supplements it by going one step further.

A unit based system does not come without its own set of drawbacks. It can be more difficult to integrate groups of small units into a single large unit than it is to integrate the same number of individuals into that large unit. This is because the small groups inevitably develop their own techniques, lingo, and customs. This complicates communication and command and makes it more difficult to achieve a uniform weapons distribution in the unit because the commander usually ends up breaking up the small groups. It is exactly because of those same traits that I believe units are more effective than groups of individuals. I believe that an army composed of 3 to 8 man (or larger) groups will perform better than an army composed of individuals for reasons that I will outline below.

“War is teamwork. It requires learning and can be practiced efficiently only after intensive training, usually accompanied by firm, sometimes savage, discipline.”[6]

Obviously none of the sane people in the SCA are going to voluntarily undergo ‘savage discipline’ for the sake of a more realistic recreation or to satisfy my personal opinion of how melee units should be organized, but this does highlight the key aspect that separates individual combat from large group melees: organization. Observe any melee and note that the successful teams fall into three categories: 1) better organized 2) better fighters and/or 3) numerically superior. The third category is a simple expression of the attrition equation (see The Blue Company Melee Manual). The second category covers ‘ringer-teams’ composed of highly skilled individual fighters. In a small to mid-sized melee they can often prevail by turning the melee into a collection of one on one battles. Even in large melees, when facing organized fighting teams, they tend to die hard by virtue of their skill and experience. The first category covers organized fighting teams.

“Four brave men who do not know each other will dare not attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. There is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell.”[7]

“When a soldier is unknown to the men who are around him he has relatively little reason to fear losing the one thing he is likely to value more highly than his life – his reputation as a man among other men.”[8]

These two quotes reach to the root of organizing fighting teams. Men who fight individually do so for their own reasons and this paper has no desire to explore those reasons. Men who fight well as members of a group do so, in part, because they value the opinion their peers hold of them. There are some problems with this generalization, remember the individual motivators, but as a rule of thumb it holds true. Certain other principles are evident in these quotes. “…knowing each other well…” “…unknown to the men who are around him…” Du Picq and Marshall are referring to the bonds between men. Close association, shared experience, and time are the only ways to form these bonds. “…sure of their reliability…” Trust is an essential element in any successful relationship. If close association, shared experience, and time reveal to one warrior that another is untrustworthy, then the bond between those men will be weak at best. One will not respect the other and the positive performance motivator is diminished or lost.

Let us consider some historical examples that support this assertion and reveal other principles. We will begin with the Greek military during the Fourth Century, B.C. We will then move on to the example of the Roman army. Finally we will jump ahead to the Swiss Cantons and their pike squares.

There are many studies of Greek Warfare with a great deal of merit, but for factual content and reader accessibility, The Western Way of War by Victor Davis-Hanson is hands down my favorite. In it, Mr. Davis-Hanson discusses the conditions of warfare in ancient Greece, from the preparation to the aftermath. Because the physical conditions in Greece made the supply of armies in the field difficult warfare tended to be comprised of short periods of armed conflict followed by truces that allowed each side to re-arm. Because terrain conveyed such an advantage to the defender, the attacker would refuse battle. The defender, in turn, could not take advantage of their position because they lacked the supplies to maintain it. So battles tended to be fairly evenly matched affairs that took place on relatively level terrain between armies which were similarly equipped and of similar capabilities.

Greek armies were made up of free citizens whose status in civilian life was partly tied to the quality of arms they could provide for themselves in time of war. The wealthy formed the heavy infantry (hoplites) and cavalry (cataphracti) while the poor supplied the light infantry and missile troops (peltasts). Within these branches they were organized by family, clan, and tribe. The performance of each man would be scrutinized and remembered by the people who formed his entire social world. This was a powerful incentive to perform well or, at the very least, not to perform poorly. Further incentive was provided by the personal relationship of each man with the men around him. Though we have no monopoly on dysfunctional families in our age we have to assume that most men cared about the welfare of their relatives to some degree. They would have been motivated to fight well lest their failure doomed their friends and family.

The battle would begin with the armies forming up within sight of each other, but out of range of a quick charge. The peltasts would form in front of the hoplites and on the wings. The cavalry would station themselves on the wings. The hoplites would form up in the center. Mass was the key to the hoplite charge, so generals were reluctant to have less than six ranks and more commonly eight to ten. Another reason for the many ranks was to allow the most experienced men to be in the front, the younger men in the middle, and the oldest men in the rear. There was likely no reserve as the General commanding the army would be down in the front line and in no position to direct them. The battle would begin with skirmishing between the peltasts and cavalry as the hoplites slowly advanced to within charging range. Once this range was reached the peltasts would withdraw from the front of the hoplites to the wings. The hoplites on either side would sing a song, a paen, and then charge. The initial collision must have been fearful as the men in front were pushed through a wall of opposing spearpoints by the mass of the men behind them. We know that spears were broken in this initial charge and the men in front became involved in a pushing contest while the men behind them added their weight to the press, thrust at the enemy with spears, or stabbed fallen foes with butt-spikes as the phalanx advanced. The old men in the rear would act as a stabilizing force, preventing the young men from panicking and fleeing, if necessary by force. In the front pockets would form and allow men to bring their swords into play or to be cut off from their comrades and killed by the enemy. Eventually, one side would lose the will to fight. Perhaps the peltasts and cavalry appeared in the rear or a popular commander was believed to have been slain. Whatever the cause the rout would begin with troops in the rear taking flight and once it began it was almost impossible to stop. Curiously, the actual casualties up to that point would have likely been relatively light. The bulk of the casualties occurred during the pursuit of the routed side.

Once routed the soldiers of the defeated army had one thought in mind: survive. Armor, reputation, wealth, all might be restored in time, but only if the soldier survived. The victorious hoplites would pursue the defeated hoplites as they desperately sought to break contact. To break contact they would abandon weapons, armor, and shields to lend speed to their flight. Unfortunately this would make them vulnerable to the peltasts and cavalry who continued the pursuit once the hoplites broke off. If they were fortunate enough to evade the peltasts and cavalry, the defeated soldiers stood a good chance of getting home. Once home they could rearm themselves to face battle another day.

The Romans were well aware of the manner in which self image helped soldiers to stand firm against the foe. In his Epitoma Rei Militaris Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus offers us the following quotes:

“For the youth in whose hands is to be placed the defence of provinces, the fortune of battles, ought to be of outstanding breeding if numbers suffice, and morals. Decent birth makes a suitable soldier, while a sense of shame prevents flight and makes him a victor.”

“It was a divinely inspired institution of the ancients to deposit ‘with the standards’ half the donative which the soldiers received, and to save it there for each soldier , so it could not be spent by the troops on extravagance or the acquisition of vain things…..Secondly, the soldier who knows that his spending money is deposited ‘with the standards’ never thinks of deserting, has greater love for the standards, and fights for them more bravely in battle, since it is human nature to care most about things on which one’s living depends.”

Not satisfied with the sense of shame, the Romans made sure to include the financial factor. Those troops who lacked a sense of shame, after all, were all the more likely to have a sense of greed. This was necessary since by the time Vegetius was writing the Roman army was largely composed of barbarians, either inducted into the legions individually or wholesale as members of the foederati.

Whether the Romans recognized it or not, they also took advantage of other bonding measures, most notably the shared experience. Roman recruits all went through the same rigorous training process. The value of this shared experience was almost as great as the training itself, for the hardships they endured together brought them closer together and gave them an experience in common with the rest of the army. The stigma of the army, the tattoo they received upon passing the entrance examinations, was more than a means of identifying deserters, it was another bond shared by the soldiers.

The Romans also recognized the value of success in building morale. Vegetius recommends sending raw troops out with experienced troops to face a small number of foes. The experience, he contends, gave them a sense of accomplishment and had the added value of making warfare familiar. The next time the troops faced a battle they would do so with the knowledge that it was possible to survive a battle, the expectation that they would win, and less fear of the unknown.

In examining the Swiss we find ourselves returning to the Greeks. The number of similarities is astounding. Both groups lived in mountainous terrain that forced them to live in small, self-governing communities. The agricultural conditions were such that it was difficult to support a specialized warrior group or full-time army. This in turn meant that each free man was obligated to defend the community and that an army could not stay in the field for long. Both nations were faced with the presence of a powerful Empire close by them; the Greeks the Persians, the Swiss the Holy Roman Empire.

It should not be surprising, then, that the Swiss created a system much like the Greeks. Unable to have a national standing army, the Swiss created a militia organized along regional lines. Like the Greeks the Swiss were organized by associations, in this case family, village, and canton. Unable to afford cavalry or the heavy armor necessary for close combat, the Swiss adopted the pike. Pikes were well suited for the Swiss organization. It allowed a mass of men to bring enormous power to bear on their foes while those foes were still too distant to respond. The point would impale a horse or rider and the axe would cut through the heavy armor of their noble foes.

Where the Swiss deviated from the Greek model was in their superior articulation. Though in theory the Greeks had multiple maneuver units organized by tribe or by city-state, in practice the heavy infantry formed a single massive unit which could only execute an advance with any degree of control. The Swiss organized their towns or cantons into squares which could maneuver independently of each other. Their ability to defend themselves from any direction freed them, in theory if not always in practice, from the need to maintain strict battle lines and to anchor or defend their flanks. Such a system was only possible with well trained and well disciplined units that were, above all, cohesive.

The Swiss ensured cohesion through their organization, rigid discipline, and their actions. Military service was taken seriously. Failure to report for duty was punishable by death. Fleeing in the face of the enemy was punishable by death. Stopping to loot was punishable by death. Numerous other offenses were punishable by, of course, death. This discipline undoubtedly contributed to the cohesion of the Swiss forces. But it was their isolation from the rest of society that most contributed to their sense of identity. This isolation was the result of actions on the part of the Swiss which transgressed the accepted norms of the societies they were in conflict with.

The Swiss were brutal fighters who rarely took prisoners. When they did take prisoners they generally ignored the conventions of the time and slaughtered them. There were sound reasons for this. The Swiss were outnumbered by militarily powerful foes who could conceivably muster a sufficiently large force and conquer them. The Swiss had to strike terror in the hearts of their foes. Men who faced the Swiss knew there would be no quarter given if they lost. At the time, the practice of ransoming prisoners was widespread and soldiers were apt to grab a prisoner and then leave the battlefield, with prisoner in tow, as quickly as possible. Moreover, the Swiss had to fight aggressively in both the tactical and strategic sense. They couldn’t keep an army in the field for long, they needed a clear resolution, quickly. In a tactical sense the Swiss were also forced to be aggressive. Their funds went to procuring weapons, not armor. In order to win a battle the Swiss had to kill their foes through offensive action. They had to strike blows, and do it before the enemy could close with them and bring their weapons to bear.

The actions of the Swiss made them international pariahs. They knew that capture was the same as death, in some cases worse since it might mean a slow death. Victory was their only option. The Swiss, in any case believed that they would win. Convinced of their invincibility they would often attack against horrendous odds. Strangely enough, they sometimes won. But even when they didn’t they inflicted severe casualties upon their foes and generally fought to the last man.

The organization of fighting teams can be reduced to four general principles.

1) Use positive peer pressure and take advantage of the human social instinct.

Build bonds and trust between the members of your group through frequent association. Practices, picnics, games, movie nights, or anything else that brings your group together.

2) Create a sense of group identity.

Your group should be have characteristics which differentiate it from the rest of the Society. A common goal or shared core values or experiences are an excellent way to accomplish this. Less effective but more visible are distinctive forms of dress, ways of speaking, or group customs and traditions. We vs. They.

3) Create an aura of success.

Start small, achieve success, and then set your goals higher. Accept the fact that defeats will occur and turn them into opportunities to learn and improve. Members should not be berated for mistakes, rather they should be encouraged to recognize their mistakes, admit them, and seek assistance in preventing them in the future. People who are afraid to fail will not learn and will not succeed.

4) Maintain rigid discipline.

This aspect of team organization is not readily available to members of the Society. We are voluntary participants and can walk away from any attempts to discipline us. Some groups have successfully made this aspect a part of their team building efforts, but I cannot in good conscience recommend it.

Specifics

When creating organized fighting teams most manuals focus on the ratios of weapon styles. They specify so many shields for each spear, so many spears for each pole, and so on down the line. In general these ratios all take on the form of an inverted pyramid, shields at the top, then spears, polearms and great weapons, the odd weapon styles, and archers and other missile troops at the bottom. This inverted pyramid carries over into tactical organization where it manifests itself in the ‘two up, one back’ formation that occurs down at the most basic team level and on up to the entire army. The problem of creating maneuver units can be expressed in two words: articulation and mass. Mass is what the Greek phalanx had. Mass is what enabled heavy cavalry to break up infantry units and rout them. It is the momentum of sheer power. Articulation is what enabled the Romans to defeat the Greeks. They couldn’t break a phalanx by attacking it frontally, so they used part of their force to flank them and attack them from the rear. The smaller Roman units could be maneuvered separately and take advantage of the opportunities this created.

The desire for mass and maneuverability has been the dilemma of army organizers for centuries. The more you have of one, the less you have of the other. Organizers have dealt with this problem by creating small units that can be combined into larger units. The Romans had maniples, cohorts, centuries, and legions. The condottieri had lancie, poste, bandiere, and compagnie, among many other names. Modern armies have teams, squads, platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, and armies. The term most frequently used throughout the Middle Ages was the lance. Instead of the teams, triads, or units some manuals propose I will stick with the lance for reasons of verisimilitude, flavor, and simplicity.

The lance was organized around the mounted knight. This was done primarily for logistical reasons. The wide dispersion of forces under what was essentially a militia system meant that it was difficult to bring together large concentrations of weapons types on a regular basis. A village or region might produce two archers, three men-at-arms, a few squires, and the knight who administered the region. These men would serve together and, more importantly, be supplied together. Since each region served under terms that might be subtly different they had to be administered by region. Of course this also meant the men were serving with their friends and family which contributed to their cohesiveness. Once we leave the purview of the militia forces and move into the area of paid professionals we find a more systematic organization of the lance but one which was still organized around the nucleus of the heavily armored, mounted warrior.

The SCA relies predominantly on a warrior system based on regions. This is particularly true in low population density kingdoms and less true in high population density kingdoms, where independent households, mercenary groups, and other organized units become possible. The lance, therefore, will be comprised of the fighters who typically make up the local fighter practice under the leadership of one of their number.

This makes it impossible to set an exact size for a lance. Each region will contribute according to their means, not according to some artificial standard. I personally favor a unit size of five to eight fighters. Beyond this upper limit it becomes difficult to maintain control of the unit without subordinate leaders. If a region has more than this number then they should form more than one lance and select an experienced fighter to direct the lances. It is important that commanders not break units up if that can be avoided. An exact weapons mix is less useful than a cohesive unit.

I believe that this system provides for greater cohesion and allows for better and more realistic training prior to large battles. It is not perfect, though. The fixed composition teams proposed by several authors have the advantage, when properly implemented, of making fighters think in terms of weapons mixes. If a team suffers attrition it can hope for an individual fighter who recognizes the need to balance the weapons mix to step in. But of course that new member probably has not worked with the team before and the fundamental advantage of a team, coordinated action, is degraded or lost.

While the exact size of a lance cannot be set, there are other actions that can be taken to create a cohesive team. Distinctive attire is, perhaps, the most important. A well practiced and highly skilled team whose members cannot be differentiated from the other schmoes around them will not be effectively utilized. Commanders will attempt to break them up to fill in the gaps in other units and be frustrated when the team members resist. A lance should have tabards which clearly identify them. If a region has more than one lance then those lances should share certain characteristics, generally a color scheme. Lances should always practice as such. The practice of breaking up units to ‘make the sides even’ should generally be avoided. The region should make efforts to recognize the efforts of their lances and the individuals who compose them. If your lance is new, consider a fighter practice raid. On a specified date, gather the lance and head off to a fighter practice you don’t usually attend. Armor your people up and publicly challenge the local fighters to best three out of five melees. If you have trained well and scouted the opposition beforehand, then you should crush them handily. After the melees are over, break down the unit to fight individually and then have a couple of friendship melees at the end with mixed teams. Your lance will now have a winning experience to build upon. Repeat this process several times, each time setting your sights a little higher. Not only will this benefit your lance, the fighters of other regions will take steps to ensure that no one comes into their practice and trounces them again. The whole kingdom benefits.

Types of Melees

Within the regulations of SCA heavy combat there are two types of battles: static front and fluid front. Actions in these types of battles can be further sub-divided into offensive and defensive actions. This is a somewhat artificial division for, in truth, there should be no difference between your offense and defense. Both should be carried out aggressively and ruthlessly with the intent of defeating your foe. A well practiced unit can shift from the defense to the offense and back as often as necessary without the need for verbal commands.

A static front battle is typically one in which terrain allows a commander to secure both of his flanks by using the natural geography of the battlefield. These features must absolutely prevent the foe from traversing the feature and physically engaging your forces in the flank or rear. These features may not prevent the foe from engaging your forces if your forces approach close enough. A river, for example, will not stop your foes from engaging you with missile weapons or spears as you cross a bridge or ford. Static front battles limit the ability of a commander to maneuver and to utilize the articulation of his forces. Mass, therefore, assumes a proportionally greater role in securing victory in these circumstances. The restrictions on maneuver also reduce the number of possible actions and counteractions that may be taken. But this also allows a commander greater scope to utilize pre-planned maneuvers and strategems secure in the knowledge that his forces only have to face a foe in their forward arc. Loss of options translates into more control for the commander and less need for decentralization of command.

A fluid front battle is typically one in which the terrain does not provide the commander with barriers to movement with which to secure his flanks. The foe is free to exploit openings in the line or to maneuver around and bypass the line altogether. No SCA battle is a true fluid front situation. We are constrained by the pre-determined limits of the designated battlefield and cannot transgress those boundaries. A fluid front situation only occurs when a commander lacks sufficient troops to form a battle line from one boundary to its opposite boundary. In a fluid front battle the ability to bring mass to bear is limited by the ability of the opposing forces to simply move out of the way. Maneuver, therefore, assumes a proportionally greater role in securing victory in these circumstances. The wide range of possibilities for maneuver also reduces the ability of the overall commander to execute pre-planned actions, which assume the existence of circumstances the foe may not provide, and to personally direct the actions of his troops. The increase in the range of options translates into less control for the commander and the need for decentralization of command. In these circumstances it is vitally important that every potential commander, i.e. everybody, be aware of the assigned mission of their unit and the role they play in the commander’s overall vision of how the foe will be defeated.

Individual Roles

There are six varieties of fighters who are allowed to participate in heavy combat. All fighters fit into these six categories. The first category is shieldmen. This category encompasses all fighters who use a shield and any other sort of weapon; mace, hammer, sword, etc… The second category is spearmen. This category encompasses all spear fighters, from 6 foot to 9 foot, except for those who use shields. Generally speaking there are no fighters who use a 6-9 foot spear and a shield because of the problem of controlling the spear with one hand. Fighters who use a shield and spear fall into the fourth category. The third category is great weapons. This category encompasses the large slashing weapons; greatswords, pole-arms, etc… The fourth category is florentines. This category encompasses the two weapon fighters; two swords, sword and dagger, sword and madu, weapon and buckler, etc… I do not include buckler fighters in the first category because they rely heavily on movement to augment their defense and are generally not capable of mounting a static defense. The fifth category is heavy missile troops. This category encompasses every fighter who uses a projectile weapon and wears heavy-combat legal armor. The sixth category is light missile troops. This category encompasses every fighter who uses a projectile weapon but does not wear heavy-combat legal armor. I personally feel that light missile troops should not be allowed to participate in heavy combat for reasons of safety and equity, but many kingdoms currently allow them, so we must discuss them.

Each category of fighter has specific roles to play in each type of fighting scenario. These roles are guidelines, not rules, and it is the responsibility of each fighter to learn when to move from one role to the next. Experience is, ultimately, the only guide.

The roles of first category troops in general.

Shields are the foundation of every unit which will physically engage the enemy. A commander who has shields and no other troop types can still successfully engage the foe. The area in which a shield fighter can directly engage the foe is a 5-6 foot radius circle drawn from the center mass of the fighter. This circle can be extended 2-3 feet with the use of a forward step which widens the stance. A fighter can influence the actions of opponents within a 6-10 foot radius circle based on the ability of the fighter to quickly advance a full stride and strike. This sphere of influence varies not with the ability of the shieldman, but with his foes’ perception of his ability. The primary job of a shieldman is to maintain the integrity of the unit by preventing the foe from penetrating their line and disrupting the unit. This is primarily a defensive action and can involve a great deal of standing around and staying alive without much opportunity to hit anyone. In this sort of a situation it is useful to have a large shield. Large shields are difficult to maneuver on broken fields or in wooded terrain, but this is a measure of skill on the part of the individual shieldman. Where a large shield truly becomes a hindrance is in a chaotic situation where the ability to move quickly is at a premium. These situations rarely occur in SCA combat because we do not allow our participants to strike from behind. Because of this a large shield, be it a kite, round, heater, or scutum, is preferable to a small shield 9 times out of 10.

The roles of first category troops in a static front situation while on the offense.

The exact role a shieldman must play will depend on a wide variety of factors. In a static front situation the primary role of the shieldmen is to maintain the line. This does not involve killing anyone. That task typically falls to the second and third category troops. Shields should advance in unison while continuing to defend the troops behind them. If a shieldman wants to be effective on the static front offense then he should use a weapon with a stabbing tip. The mast majority of the slashing blows a shieldman uses require movement to set them up whereas the thrusting tip can be used with an minimum of movement. The thrusting tip of a fairly short sword can find holes that a cutting blow cannot. On the other hand, it is much more likely that a cutting blow will be aknowledged in the press where any but the hardest thrusts might be discounted as jostling. When it is time for the shieldmen to engage they must be disciplined and aggressive. Discipline maintains the line, aggression kills foes. Close action of the type dictated by a charge or a pulse should place a premium on defending by aggressively attacking. If the attacking line is throwing more blows than the defenders, then the defenders will spend more time defending themselves and less time throwing blows. Granted this is circular logic, but the idea is basically sound. However, at no time during this aggressive defense should the shieldman forget that his primary mission is to protect the second and third category troops behind him by staying alive and maintaining the line.

The roles of first category troops in a static front situation while on the defense.

The shieldman contributes to the overall accomplishment of the mission principally by staying alive and functioning as a human barrier. Should the opportunity arise the shieldman should not ignore the chance to make a clean kill, but he should ignore anything less than a sure thing. This is not to say that the shieldman should not swing his sword. The shieldman can help keep the foe at a respectful distance simply by throwing that sword out at a target every few minutes. The key, when doing this, is to make sure the arm that carries that sword out comes back to the protection of the line in one piece.

The time when shieldmen are most valuable is when the foe charges. In these instances it is up to the shieldmen to stop the physical advance of the foe. The second and third category troops will do the actual killing and reserve troops of the first and fourth category will mop up troops that do break through the line. The front rank shieldmen must not yield to the temptation and be drawn into a confused slugfest that leaves the line open to penetration. Close and re-establish the line as quickly as possible. For more guidance on breaking a charge see Appendix .

The roles of first category troops in a fluid front situation while on the offense.

There are two types of offense in this situation, the advance and the penetration. The advance is a measured, general forward motion in which the primary goal of the shieldmen remains the maintenance of the line. They continue to provide cover for the second and third category troops who do the lion’s share of the killing. An advance can be at a slow pace or can be a full charge. Whatever speed it is conducted at it aims at pushing the foe back along the entire length of your line. The penetration is a charge aimed at breaking through the entire enemy formation. The primary troops in this action are the first category troops. But, once again, they are not trying to kill people. They are trying to disrupt the opposing formation by pushing through it. They do this by brute force. They do not stop to kill people. They do, however, push those people to one side or run over them. A shieldman should be alive when he reaches the far side of the enemy formation and continues on through. Too many penetration charges come to a chaotic stop as the first rank, or second and third ranks, stop to kill foes. This holds up the advance of the ranks behind them and kills the momentum of the entire charge.

The roles of first category troops in a fluid front situation while on the defense.

There are no defensive situations in a fluid front melee. There are times when you are temporarily unable to pursue your offensive strategy. These are times when you have lost the initiative. You must retake the initiative and begin to conduct offensive actions. The end result of attempting to defend in a fluid front situation is encirclement and destruction. The nature of SCA combat creates an exception to this rule. It is possible to anchor a flank against the field boundary and hold a line. If it is possible to anchor both flanks and to hold a line across the entire field then you are in a static front situation, not a fluid front. Any holding action on your anchored flank will be temporary at best. By definition the foe will be able to find an opening and bypass your blocking force. If you are forced to fight defensively in this situation, keep the line tight, stay alive, break out if you can, and die hard if you can’t. A good commander on the flank will attempt to push the foe against the boundary. This will inhibit their ability to move and use the foe’s mass against them. By dropping a few of the front rank you create a living wall composed of foes. This wall restricts the ability of the foe to make a concerted attack and is a truly elegant way to defend a flank.

The role of second category troops in general.

“Spearmen are the teeth of a unit.”[9] The primary responsibility of second category troops is killing the foe. Remember the example of the Swiss pikemen? A spear is an excellent offensive weapon and a poor defensive weapon; spearmen must attack. In particular, spears must work in conjunction with each other and the first category troops in order to be effective. The goal is for all the spears to kill all of the foe, not for every spearman to kill a large number of foes. A spearman who does nothing but assist other spearmen in killing foes is just as valuable as the spearmen who do the actual killing. Spears should be of the maximum allowable length and should have a sturdy protrusion for hooking shields. Shieldmen should talk to each other and work in ad-hoc teams. One man hooks a shield, another takes advantage of the opening to get the kill. It is very difficult to kill a foe from within his tunnel arc. The tunnel arc is an arc of approximately 15 degrees to either side of the foe which represents the area the foe is concentrating on. This tunnel vision gives the foe an extremely focused view of the threats immediately before him. The spearman must attack from outside this tunnel arc in order to maximize his chances of a successful kill. This is known as attacking on the oblique. The downside to fighting on the oblique is the loss of range this entails. The maximum range of a spear is about 9 feet plus the length of the spearman's arm, approximately 2 feet more[10]. This 11 foot engagement range is decreased when the spear is thrust at any angle off the perpendicular to the opposing line. Spearmen fighting on the oblique can find themselves easy prey to spearmen fighting straight ahead. To prevent this they should, again, work together. While brushing aside spears intended to strike their comrades will save lives, communication will save more lives still.

The roles of second category troops in a static front situation while on the offense.

Second category troops, for the most part, make up the second rank in these situations. This allows them to make maximum use of their offensive range while offering them the protection of the shield wall. In some rare situations the second category troops will be able to move forward into the front rank, temporarily. This can only happen in situations where the foe is prevented from charging. When the line advances the second category troops allow the third category troops to pass through their line. The third category troops then become the second rank, and the second category troops become the third rank. In this way we are able to bring the maximum numbers of weapons to bear on the foe by using the different weapon ranges. In many situations the first and third category troops will fill the available space and the second category troops will not be able to bring their weapons to bear. During these times the second category troops can still contribute to the offense by defending the first two ranks from overhead blows. Do this by forming an umbrella of weapon shafts above the first two ranks, deflecting, and catching overhead swings from the foe.

The roles of second category troops in a static front situation while on the defense.

Second category troops traditionally make up the second rank. Their job while the line does not advance is to kill people. Second category troops actually get to do more killing on the defense than the offense.

The roles of second category troops in a fluid front situation while on the offense.

In fluid front situations second category troops are still in the second rank but they may find individual members floating into the first rank from time to time and will almost certainly find that third category troops are now members of the second rank. Second category troops must continue to strike offensively. They will do the bulk of the killing from within the protective base provided by the first category troops.

The roles of second category troops in a fluid front situation while on the defense.

Again, there are only transient moments when you are not attacking in a fluid front situation. Second category troops should continue to strike aggressively and kill as many of the foe as possible. Once sufficient numbers have been killed it will be possible to resume the attack.

The roles of third category troops in general.

More so than any other weapons style, the troops of the third category must be aggressive, ruthless, and fast. Like the second category troops the strength of third category troops lies in the offense. When they are called into action third category troops go from a medium range situation to a close range situation very quickly. In a crowded melee their movement will be restricted and movement is their primary defense. They must kill the foe before the foe uses this fact to their advantage. In a sense third category troops are shock troops. They strike hard and fast, let others clean up the mess they leave, regroup behind a protective screen of first and second category troops and then do it all again.

The roles of third category troops in a static front situation while on the offense.

Third category troops traditionally make up the third rank. When the line advances they must move up and become the second rank. They will be responsible for doing the bulk of the killing. Their shorter shafts (in comparison to the second category troops) allow them greater mobility in attacking the foe and their slashing attacks can rain down from above with crushing strength. Once the line has stabilized third category troops must be savvy enough to let the second category troops back up into the second rank.

The roles of third category troops in a static front situation while on the defense.

Third category troops have even less fun than first category troops while on the defense. They are taking actions which are mostly defensive, but from behind two ranks of troops. They don’t even get to snarl at the foe, they generally get to look at the backs of helms for an hour or so. They also get to deflect overhead attacks and make the occasional foray into the second rank to replace a downed second category trooper until a replacement can be found. But when the foe charges, the third category troops must fling themselves in the fray with aggressive abandon. They are responsible for killing the foe while the first two ranks physically contain them. The third category troops must also act to quickly staunch any breakthroughs. When a charge comes, the third rank assumes the responsibility for holding the line. The first and second ranks will probably be broken and the third rank must hold their line, kill the foe, break the charge, and let the first two ranks be re-established.

The roles of third category troops in a fluid front situation while on the offense.

In this situation the third category troops will find that they are called upon to join in the formation of the first and second ranks. Their role is to attack aggressively from within the protective line of the first category troops. This line is less fixed, however, and third category troops will often find themselves darting out to take advantage of opportunities to attack. In this situation the third category troops should make every effort to enlist the aid of other troop categories to create opportunities to slay the foe. Third category troops can be usefully employed on the flanks where they will find greater opportunity to maneuver and act aggressively.

The roles of third category troops in a fluid front situation while on the defense.

When the front is not attacking, the role of the third category troops is the same as in a static defensive situation. As soon as the attack resumes they must again move up from the third rank to the second and first ranks.

The roles of fourth category troops general.

The strength of fourth category troops lies in the offense and mobility. Because a large portion of their defensive ability is constituted by movement, these troops tend to be used as skirmishers and light infantry. Their mobility and offensive abilities in close makes them invaluable in broken and wooded terrain. They are frequently used as flanking forces to turn the foe or deny the flank. They also see a great deal of use as ‘mop-up’ troops, following behind the first three categories to finish off the wounded. Finally, they are frequently used as reaction/reserve forces to be committed against units that break through the line.

The roles of fourth category troops in a static front situation while on the offense.

This is a boring situation for fourth category troops as they must sit around and wait for the line to make significant advances. During this time they must be close enough to the front ranks to kill any wounded the front ranks pass over yet they must remain aware of the need for a constant flow of first, second, and third category troops through their ranks. If a breakthrough charge is called for, the fourth category troops will find themselves dealing with large numbers of foes who have been bypassed by the front ranks. The fourth category troops must take advantage of the confused state of these foes to aggressively and ruthlessly finish them off lest the become a solid nucleus of resistance and collapse the integrity of the entire formation.

The roles of fourth category troops in a static front situation while on the defense.

Fourth category troops, in conjunction with some first and third category troops held in the rear, form the ready reserve. When the foe charges they act to staunch any breakthroughs by hurling themselves upon the foe in overwhelming numbers. Attack, attack, attack.

The roles of fourth category troops in a fluid front situation while on the offense.

Fourth category troops really enjoy these situations. The float around the back and flanks and get to do a great deal of fighting. They reinforce the front ranks when they attack strong points. They mop up wounded survivors. They harry the foes flanks and herd them into an unorganized mass to be slaughtered. They plug holes in the line. Fourth category troops should take care, in these situations, not to separate themselves from a source of support. The timely intervention of a first, second, or third category trooper can often mean the difference between success or failure.

The roles of fourth category troops in a fluid front situation while on the defense.

For most other troops this situation is unpleasant, but fourth category troops generally get to enjoy some good fighting. They prevent the foe from attacking the flanks of the main body. They act to plug holes in the line. They staunch breakthroughs. They are in constant motion and always acting aggressively.

The roles of fifth and sixth category troops in general.

Sir Jon Fitz-Rauf has already written a substantial paper on the role of missile troops in SCA combat. It is included as an appendix to this paper and deserves your attention. I will not attempt to make any new observations and will confine myself to summarizing his key points. Missile troops are generally used in three roles: individual snipers, small teams, and massed units. Individual snipers rely on surprise and accuracy to sneak up on targets and engage them. Small teams work cooperatively with other troop categories and embody the '20 Yard Pike' concept. By thinking of them as spearmen with enormous range you can get commanders to effectively utilize them. Massed units have seen limited use and less success in the SCA. War conventions that limit the number of arrows an archer may use, small numbers of available archers and rules that prevent archers from engaging troops from behind take most of the sting out of massed volleys of arrows. Fifth category troops have an advantage over sixth category troops in that they can draw closer to the actual fighting and be more effective.

Tactics

The actual tactics that can be used by a commander are infinite due to variations in terrain, weapons, numbers, etc... But all tactical movements have some basic roots in common. These common movements are illustrated and discussed, briefly, below.

The Frontal Assault

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